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a b s t r a c t
Property rights are increasingly utilized for environmental and resource management: in fisheries these
market-based approaches take the form of individual transferable quotas. This paper studies labor
contracts in fisheries governed by individual transferable quotas (ITQs). Previous literature on labor
contracts in fisheries models the dominance of a share system of remuneration between boat owner and
crew in fisheries. We extend the standard model of the labor contract to the case of ITQ fisheries to
explain the share contract between crew and boat owner and the share contract between boat owner and
quota owner when boat owner, quota owner, and crew are risk averse in a stochastic environment. We
test this model through analysis of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery and present empirical evidence of
changes in contracting practices, harvest rates and shares of crew remuneration.
 2008 Elsevier Ltd. All rights reserved.
1. Introduction
The persistence of share contracts in agriculture in developing
countries is the focus of substantial economics literature (e.g. Refs.
[3,10]). Fisheries provide a valuable context to examine labor con-
tracting: the output is stochastic by nature, the labor efforts are
usually unobservable, and total output is a product of joint effort.
Worldwide, the dominant form of payment to fishery labor is
a share system, inwhich a portion of the revenue or profit is paid to
the crew in lieu of a fixed wage [26]. Across fisheries, the form of
the crew share system varies between a share of gross revenues
only or a share of net profit after deducting specified variable costs,
and the share system exists in fisheries regardless of the degree of
economic development [19]. It has been shown that when the boat
owner and crew members are risk averse in a stochastic environ-
ment, crop sharing is the optimal contract, and will produce
a higher effort level than a wage contract (see Refs. [32,1,27]).
Previous literature on the share system has focused on its
optimality over a wage system in fisheries. Given the increasing
emphasis on the use of market mechanisms for resource manage-
ment in developed and developing countries, a central question is
whether the crew share system will continue and whether crew
shares (and hence expected incomes of fishing communities) will
decrease [24,25,17]. Hannesson [14] models the effect of a share
system on the level of investment in capital under ITQs and
investment with optimal management, while Grafton has noted
that the use of the share systemmay be replaced with either awage
or fixed rate payment [12,11]. However, there is no detailed treat-
ment of the change in the share system itself after introducing ITQs.
Command-and-control regulation in fisheries, which has been
criticized for inducing serious economic inefficiencies, safety
hazards, and ecosystem damage, is often blamed for creating the
classic ‘‘race for fish’’ [12,24].2 By contrast, in fisheries managed
with individual transferable quotas (ITQs), the fisherman has
a guaranteed proportion of the total allowable catch (TAC), and can
harvest that share throughout the season. There remain, however,
questions about how a fishery will change once ITQs are
implemented.
Of particular concern is the reported practice of reducing the
crew’s share for harvests where the boat owner leases quota to
cover the harvest, a practice for which there is ample anecdotal
evidence. Changes in the form and amount of crew remuneration
have been documented in various fisheries which implemented
ITQs including the surf clam and ocean quahog fishery [21], British
Columbia halibut fishery [5] and a range of Icelandic fisheries
[6,24]. The drop in crew incomes due to this practice under ITQs led
to widespread tensions in Icelandic fisheries [7]. The potential
redistribution of bargaining power between crew and capital
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2 Perhaps the most dramatic example of the race for fish is the infamous ‘‘Halibut
Derby’’ in Alaska between 1990 and 1994, during which 24- to 48-h periods of
frantic fishing led to accidents, loss of gear, extreme booms and busts in the supply
of halibut, and fishing-related deaths. Under ITQ management the halibut fishery is
now open from March to November. Similar changes have been reported in the
wreckfish [29,9] and British Columbia halibut fisheries [5].
owners has helped fuel the policy debate over the socioeconomic
impact of ITQs on fishing communities.
In fisheries with ITQs, the ITQ itself is a new form of capital
distinct from the vessel. We designate firms that own vessels as
‘‘boat owners’’, who may or may not own ITQs. One significant
difference between command-and-control and ITQs is that under
ITQs a firm can sell its vessels but retain its ITQs. A firm that owns
ITQs but not vessels is still a significant capital owner in this fishery
and can lease its ITQs to boat owners. We term this type of firm
a ‘‘quota owner’’. Markets for leasing quota have been documented
in many fisheries including those in the US [24], Iceland, Nether-
lands, New Zealand and Canada [15]. In New Zealand, for example,
the number of leases increased from 2000 occurrences in 1986 to
16,000 occurrences in 1998, and there is evidence that the
relationship between quota lease and sale prices reflects econom-
ically rationale behavior [23]. The individual’s choice between
owning and leasing quota is driven by the relative prices and access
to financial capital, and this analysis is left for future research. In
this paper we focus on contracting once the firm’s portfolio of
owned and leased quota is determined.
In this paper, we explore the optimal fishery contract when
there are three contracting parties: crew, boat owners, and quota
owners. The central contracting party is the boat owner, who
negotiates bilaterally with both quota owner and labor (the crew),
a standard practice in fisheries. We extend the standard model of
labor contracts in fisheries which establishes that crop sharing is
the optimal contract when boat owners and crewmembers are risk
averse (see Ref. [27]). We maintain the basic features of this model
including the production function for a single-species fishery,
a normally distributed random term, and absence of market power.
We introduce a third contracting party, the quota owner, into the
model to study the impact of ITQ on contracting practices. The focus
of our analysis is on the temporary ownership, i.e. leasing of ITQs,
for twomain reasons. First, the leasing of ITQs is a noted innovation
in the fishing industry, which has been observed in many ITQ
fisheries, but not incorporated into the standard models. Second, it
is the impact of this new type of transaction on crew that is of
policy interest. We simplify some of the attributes of the ITQ fishery
to emphasize the basic results of the model, without loss of
generality. We show that when boat owner, quota owner, and crew
member are risk averse in a stochastic environment, the optimal
contract has two components: a crop-sharing contract between
quota owner and boat owner, and crop sharing between the boat
owner and crew. This crop-sharing contract is defined mainly by
two parameters: (1) a fixed rental price q for each unit of quota that
the boat owner rents from the quota owner at the very beginning of
the year; and (2) a share rate a of output price paid by the boat
owner to the quota owner for each unit of quota which is rented
and actually used during the year.
The negotiation between boat owner, crew and quota owner is
modeled in Section 2, and the crew’s choice of effort under varying
contracts is modeled in Section 3. Sections 4 and 5 test this model
through analysis of the Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery; Section 4
describes some of the shifts in the usage of capital and employment
of labor brought about by ITQs in this fishery, and Section 5
presents empirical evidence of changes in contracting practices and
harvest rates.
2. Share contracting in ITQ fisheries
Assume that at the very beginning of the year, after investigating
themarket demand for the output, the boat ownermakes a plan for
howmuch he is going to harvest (H) in the year. Crewmembers are
paid a share of the harvest instead of a wage rate. If the quota he
owns (qb) is less than the amount he plans to harvest, the boat
owner has to rent the remaining quota from the quota owner
(H qb). Since there is an uncertainty (m) associated with the
harvest due to stochastic elements including the weather and
biological parameters, it is possible for the boat owner to lease
more ITQs than needed.
We assume that in addition to a fixed rental price q for each unit
of quota rented – no matter whether or not it is actually used
during the year – the boat owner also pays a share (a) of output
price (P) to the quota owner for each unit of rented quota that is
actually used (mH qb) during the year. These two components
form the income of the quota owner, but represent a variable cost
for the boat owner. The boat owner then shares the realized
revenue and this variable cost with the crew by choosing the share
rate (r). The variables used in the model are listed below.
P price of output
m random term associated with the output where E[m]¼ 1
and Var½m ¼ s2m. Demand, production, or both can be
considered as random.3
H output, a function of effort level and stock of fish
L effort level
X stock of fish
qb boat owner’s own quota
r crew share of revenue and cost
q fixed price paid by the boat owner to the quota owner for
each quota unit rented
a share of output price paid by the boat owner to the quota
owner for each quota unit rented and actually used
bb boat owner’s distaste for income variability
bq quota owner’s distaste for income variability
bc crew’s distaste for income variability
d annual rate of return on investment in quota from selling
quota
M per-unit sale price of quota
W opportunity cost per unit of effort by the crew
FC fixed costs
The income (I) and utility (U) functions of the quota owner, boat
owner and crew are described in Sections 2.1–2.3, respectively. The
parameters (bb, bc, bq) describe the respective distastes for income
variability of the boat owner, crew, and quota owner. With our
assumption that all contracting parties are risk averse, the param-
eters (bb, bc, bq) are always larger than 0 but less than 1.
2.1. Quota owner
Recall that we use the term ‘‘quota owner’’ to designate
a firm that owns quota but not vessels, and such a firm’s income
has two components. One is the fixed rental price paid by the
boat owner for each unit of quota rented at the beginning of the
year (q(H qb)). The other is the share of output price paid by
the boat owner (aP) for each unit that is leased and actually used
(mH qb). The random term (m) enters the second component,
the harvest, but not the first, the fixed rental rate. The first
component is a payment by the boat owner for the right to use
quota during the season; whether or not he actually uses the
quota, he must compensate the quota owner for its opportunity
cost. But the boat owner only has to share revenue with the
quota owner for those units that are actually used during the
year.
Iq ¼ qðH  qbÞ þ aPðmH  qbÞ (1a)
3 We follow the assumption made by Plourde and Smith [27] about the
distribution of the random term, because we are interested in how the introduction
of ITQs changes the results of the model.
The quota owner is risk averse and has preferences given by the
mean–variance utility function:
Uq ¼ E

Iq
 bq Var

Iq

¼ aPðH  qbÞ þ qðH  qbÞ  a2P2H2bqs2m (1b)
2.2. Boat owner
A boat owner receives income from harvests (H) sold at price P
and pays the crew a share of this revenue (r). If the boat owner
harvests more than the quota owned, then the boat owner must
cover the surplus harvest by leasing quota through a contract with
a quota owner [aP(mH qb)þ q(H qb)]. As stated in the introduc-
tion, there is evidence that in ITQ fisheries the crewpays a portion of
the cost of leasing quota. The share of the cost of leasing quota that is
not covered by the crew is (1 r). Fixed costs are subtracted from
the boat owner’s income (FC). The boat owner then receives
Ib ¼ ð1 rÞPmH  ð1 rÞ½aPðmH  qbÞ þ qðH  qbÞ  FC (2a)
Eq. (2a) states that the boat owner’s income is equal to his share of
the realized revenue (after the crew share), minus fixed costs and
his share of variable cost (from leasing quota). The associated
preference function is
Ub ¼ E½Ib  bb Var½Ib
¼ ð1 rÞ½PH  aPðH  qbÞ  qðH  qbÞ
 FC ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2P2H2bbs2m ð2bÞ
2.3. Crew
The crew receives a share of the revenue from the harvest
(rPmH). The cost of leasing the ITQs is shared with the crew
(r[aP(mH qb)þ q(H qb)]). The crew income is then
Ic ¼ rPmH  r½aPðmH  qbÞ þ qðH  qbÞ (3a)
The expression of the preference function for the crew income
function in Eq. (3a) is
Uc ¼ E½Ic  bc Var½Ic ¼ r½PH  aPðH  qbÞ  qðH  qbÞ
 r2ð1 aÞ2P2H2bcs2m ð3bÞ
Below we present the solution to this model, and details are in
the Appendix. The optimization problem is for the boat owner to
maximize his utility (2b) subject to the constraints that both the
quota owner and the crew accept their respective contracts. The
boat owner guarantees a fixed level of utility to the crew and quota
owner to induce them to participate in the contract.
The participation constraint of the quota owner is
Uq ¼ dMðHqbÞ ¼ aPðHqbÞþqðHqbÞa2P2H2bqs2m
0aPðHqbÞþqðHqbÞ ¼ a2P2H2bqs2mþdMðHqbÞ ð4Þ
This constraint states that the contract arrangement should
compensate the quota owner’s opportunity cost of leasing quota.
This opportunity cost is measured by the annual return on invest-
ment from selling the quota at the very beginning of the year. There
is no random component because the quota owner loses the ability
to sell the quota, whether or not it is actually used during the year.
The analogous participation constraint of the crew member is
Uc ¼WL¼ r½PHaPðHqbÞqðHqbÞr2ð1aÞ2P2H2bcs2m
0r½PHaPðHqbÞqðHqbÞ ¼ r2ð1aÞ2P2H2bcs2mþWL
(5)
This constraint states that crew’s utility from participating in this
contract arrangement equals what they could get from their next
best available alternative.
There are four choice variables in this case: effort level (L), fixed
rental price of quota (q), share of output paid to quota owner (a),
and crew share of revenue and variable cost (r). Substituting the
participation constraints (4) and (5) into the boat owner’s utility
function and rearranging yields
Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC
 P2H2s2m
h
a2bq þ r2ð1 aÞ2bc þ ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2bb
i
ð6Þ
The value of a and r that maximizes Ub will be the solution to:
Min D ¼ a2bq þ r2ð1 aÞ2bc þ ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2bb (7)
The first-order conditions of Eq. (7) yield
r* ¼ bb
bb þ bc
(8a)
a* ¼ r
2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
bq þ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
(8b)
Substituting r* into Eq. (8b) yields a*:
a* ¼ r
2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
bq þ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
¼ bbbc
bqðbb þ bcÞ þ bbbc
From this expression, we notice that a* is always between 0 and 1. It
is equal to 0 if and only if bb or bc is zero or both of them are zero –
that is, if the boat owner or crew is risk neutral or both of them are
risk neutral. Since we have assumed that both are risk averse, a*
will not be zero. This implies that whenever production is feasible,
a share contract between boat owner and quota owner is optimal.
Note that the optimal quota share parameter a* and optimal
harvest share parameter r* are both independent of market
variables such as output price and effort level; they are purely
determined by the risk aversion parameters of boat owner, crew,
and quota owner.
Previous literature showed that in a stochastic production
environment share contracts will be optimal.4 Themodel presented
here extends this result to the case of ITQ fisheries. The results show
in ITQ fisheries, a share contract between crew and boat owner will
persist, and a share contract between boat owner and quota owner
will emerge. This model explains anecdotal evidence of the
emergence of share contracts under ITQs.
3. Crew effort under an ITQ share contract
This section compares the crew’s effort level, under a crop share
contract, over trips differentiated by quota ownership: (1) trips
using the boat owner’s own quota, where boat owner and crew
share the gross revenue; and (2) trips with leased quota, where
boat owner and crew share both revenue and the cost of leasing
quota. In this section, we assume a deterministic harvest function
to illustrate the incentives created by share contracts in ITQ
fisheries. The objective is to show how effort level differs between
these two types of trips.
4 The optimal solution r* (share between boat owner and crew member) to our
model where there are three contracting parties is the same as the optimal solution
r* in Plourde and Smith [27] where there are only two contracting parties including
boat owner and crew member.
3.1. Trips with boat owner’s ITQs
For a given stock of fish (X) the amount of harvest (H) depends
on the effort level of crew (L). For trips inwhich the boat owner uses
his own ITQs for the harvest, the utility functions of boat owner and
crew can be expressed as
Ub ¼ PHðL;XÞ  rPHðL;XÞ  FC (9a)
Uc ¼ rPHðL;XÞ  CðLÞ (9b)
where C(L) shows the disutility of the crew from effort. As in the
previous section, there is a participation constraint in which the
boat owner guarantees a reservation utility of U to the crew. Then
the boat owner solves
Max Ub ¼ PHðL;XÞ  rPHðL;XÞ  FC ð10Þ
subject to :
Uc ¼ rPHðL;XÞ  CðLÞ ¼ U
Substituting the constraint into the objective function and solving
the first-order condition gives
P ¼ CL
HL
(11)
This equation indicates that the optimal effort level is achieved
when the marginal output value of an extra unit of effort is equal to
the crew’s marginal disutility from that effort. The optimal effort
level, L*, is the solution to this first-order condition.
3.2. Trips with leased ITQs
In contrast, for trips where leased quota is used, the utility
functions of boat owner and crew reflect that a part of the revenue
from harvests covers the costs of leasing. The utility functions are
Ub ¼ ð1 rÞPHðL;XÞ  ð1 rÞqHðL;XÞ  FC (12a)
Uc ¼ rPHðL;XÞ  rqHðL;XÞ  CðLÞ (12b)
Again, we assume that the boat owner guarantees a reservation utility
of U to the crew. The boat owner’s optimal choice problem becomes
Max Ub ¼ ð1 rÞPHðL;XÞ  ð1 rÞqHðL;XÞ  FC ð13Þ
subject to :
Uc ¼ rPHðL;XÞ  rqHðL;XÞ  CðLÞ ¼ U
The first-order condition for this optimization is
P  q ¼ CL
HL
(14)
The optimal effort level, L**, is the solution to the above condition.
To compare the effort level over these two types of trips, we
differentiate CL/HL with respect to L. The standard assumption
about production indicates that H(L,X) is increasing in L and
concave, and C(L) is increasing and convex, which means the
marginal output from effort is decreasing while the marginal
disutility of effort is increasing. That is
HL > 0; HLL < 0; CL > 0; CLL > 0
Based on these assumptions, we can sign the above equation:
vCLHL
vL
¼ CLLHL  HLLCL
H2L
> 0 (15)
This result indicates that CL/HL is an increasing function of L.
Because CL/HL is increasing over L, and P> P q, the optimal
effort level in the first case (boat owner’s own quota) is higher than
in the second case (leased quota). This is an intuitive result, in that
the crew has to bear its share of the leasing cost in the second case.
Our model of contracting between boat owners and crewmakes
three behavioral assumptions that are consistentwith the economic
literature. First, crewmembers have declining utilitywith respect to
effort. Second, in order to retain crew the contract must provide at
least enough utility as crew would receive in their next best alter-
native. This participation constraint states that the crew earns at
least their reservation utility of U. Third, the contract offered to the
quota owner must provide at least the minimum utility the quota
owner would receive in their next best alternative. The boat owner
then maximizes his utility subject to these constraints by choosing
three variables: the fixed rental price of a quota, the share of the
harvest paid to the quota owner, and the share of harvest costs
shared by the crew. Conceptually this optimization means that the
boat owner weighs the benefits of passing the cost of leasing the
quota on to the crewwith the cost of the reduced crew effort. These
three variables completely describe the contract offered to the crew
who then has one choice variable, the effort level. The first-order
condition for the boat owner shows that it is optimal for the boat
owner to accept the lower effort level of the crew, because it allows
the boat owner to pass along the cost of leasing the quota.
There are two critical results from this model. First, under ITQs,
the share system incorporates both the agreement between boat
owner and crew and the agreement between boat owner and quota
owner. Second, because the crew shares the cost of leasing quota,
their incentive is to harvest at a lower rate than on a trip where the
quota is owned by the boat owner. This result is similar to that in
agricultural share contracts [2].
While this model explains why deducting the cost of the leasing
of quota is a stable arrangement in the case of an ITQ fishery, one
could then contemplate if ITQs could create the conditions for
optimality of a wage system instead of the traditional share
system.5 To address this question, one needs to consider the two
modeling perspectives used to explain the share system, risk
sharing [27,32] andmoral hazard [13,22], and then ask whether the
introduction of ITQ changes the conditions of these models. In the
case of risk sharing we feel that the change to ITQs is unlikely to
create such a shift to a wage system, because boat owners’
preferences are pre-determined and arguably exogenous to the
regulatory setting. In the moral hazard approach making the crew’s
payment dependent on the harvest addresses the problem that the
crew has the incentive to shirk because his effort is not observed or
verifiable. While ITQs may change the pace of harvesting, there is no
evidence that the actual fishing process, or the ability to verify the
effort of individual crew has changed. We therefore conclude that
the introduction of ITQs will change the nature of the share contract
but not the motivation and thus existence of the share system.
4. Case study: Mid-Atlantic surf clam fishery
The theoretical model of firm contracting explains the share
contract both between boat owner and crew and between boat
owner and quota owner (Eqs. (8a) and (8b)). In addition, the model
of crew behavior in Section 3 indicates that the optimal effort level
on trips with leased quota should be lower than that on trips with
the boat owner’s quota.
We verify these models using evidence gathered by extensive
field interviews and harvest data in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam
fishery, which is described in this section. The data used to estimate
the models in this paper are from the National Marine Fishery
5 The authors thank an anonymous reviewer for posing this question.
Service logbook reporting system, which documents every
harvesting trip taken by every vessel.6
4.1. Changes in capital utilization
In 1976, the Mid-Atlantic Fishery Management Council
restricted allowable fishing time in the surf clam fishery and
implemented a limited access system. By the mid-1980s, however,
rapid growth in harvesting capacity and resulting inefficiencies led
to a proposal to implement a property rights system; from the
mid-1980s to 1988, council meetings were dominated by the
contentious issue of distributing quotas among the industry
participants. The ITQ allocation formula was finalized in 1988,7 and
the first full year of tradable property rights was 1991.
One long-term benefit associated with the ITQ system is the
reduction of excess capital. From Fig. 1, it is evident that the number
of vessels active in harvesting surf clams increased from 1985 to
1990. However, there was a dramatic reduction in the number of
vessels in 1991, falling from 39 in 1990 to 26 in 1991. This reduction
in fishing capital reflects a significant change in industry structure
resulting from the anticipated policy change. In the years following
1991, the number of vessels continued to slowly decline.
The reduction in capital in the fishery was concurrent with an
increase in time of fishing per vessel. Of the independent vessels
that harvested before and after ITQs, 75% increased their annual
total hours at sea in 1995 compared to that in year 1990. The
percentage increase in time spent at sea ranges from a low of 16% to
a high of 1100%.
4.2. Impact of ITQs on crew
We are specifically concerned with the impact of this change on
crews and crew contracts. Vessel logbooks record the number of
crew used per fishing trip. By aggregating the number of crew
recorded per vessel, we found that the reduction of vessels in the
fishery significantly reduced the total labor employed by the sector.
In 1990, 155 crew members were employed in this sector; this
number fell to 98 in 1993, 83 in 1995, and 34 in 1999. These
numbers reflect a dramatic decline in the potential employment for
fishing crew in this sector, due to the consolidation of capital. This is
consistent with our expectation that the total crew in the sector
will be reduced by the introduction of ITQs, since some vessels exit
the market by selling their quota.
Other researchers have posited that those vessels remaining in
the sector could substitute additional fishing time for crew
members, because the elimination of the ‘‘race for fish’’ creates
more orderly fishing conditions [11]. However, this substitution for
employment was not significant in the surf clam fishery; of the 12
vessels that were active in both 1990 and 1995, only one vessel
increased its crew size and the remaining kept crew size constant
over that period.
Under the payment system prior to ITQs, crew members shared
gross revenues with the boat owner, a typical arrangement allotting
1/3 of the gross revenues to the crew [16]. However, with the
introduction of ITQs, this system changed, with boat owners
generally deducting the cost of leasing quota from the gross
revenues, and then sharing the net revenues with the crew. A
typical arrangement now is for the boat owner to pay half of the
gross revenues to the quota owner, and then share the remaining
half with the crew. In this case, the crew share of net revenues is
still 1/3, but its actual share of gross revenues is reduced to 1/6.
However, if ships spent more time at sea and ITQs increased
fishing efficiency, crew members could still be better off under the
new system. Table 1 summarizes the changes in per-vessel crew
payments from 1992 to 1999, relative to the same set of vessels in
1990. The first row is the count of vessels operating in that year that
were also operating in 1990. The second row is the count of vessels
whose total crew income in that year was greater than the total
crew payment for the same vessel in 1990. Of the 19 vessels active
in the sector in both 1990 and 1992, crew income from harvesting
surf clams increased in five vessels and decreased in 14 vessels:
approximately one-quarter of the boats operating in both periods
saw crew payments increase relative to 1990 while three-quarter
saw them decline relative to 1990. By 1999 the proportion of vessels
with total crew payments that were higher than in 1990 had
reached 80%. The mean total payment to crew for harvesting surf
clams was $77,319 in 1990 (standard deviation of $39,441), while
the mean in 1995 was $115,755 (standard deviation of $97,740).8
Standard models of ITQs in fisheries predict a reduction of
overcapitalization, consolidation of capital, and efficient use of
remaining capital. These changes were observed in the surf clam
fishery after the introduction of ITQs. In summary, ITQs produced
a significant decrease in capital in the fishery, but an increase in the
mean amount of time vessels spent at sea. For crews, ITQs led to
a reduction in total employment in the fishery, but an increase in
the mean payment for harvesting surf clams.
In addition to the changes predicted by standard models, the
model presented in Sections 2 and 3 predicts changes in
contracting in the fishery. Empirical evidence of these changes is
presented in the next section.
5. Empirical evidence of share contracts
5.1. Emergence of new contractual relationships
This fishery consists of three types of participants: independent
firms, vertically integrated firms and horizontally integrated firms
(for discussion of participant types see Ref. [20]). For our empirical
analysis we considered those vessels owned by independent firms,
firms that were neither vertically integrated with the processing
sector nor horizontally integrated with other fishing vessels. In
field interviews, participants reported that independent firms
consistently subtract the cost of a quota only if the quota is owned
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Fig. 1. Active vessels, 1985–1999.
6 Compliance with reporting regulations is rated as high [18].
7 The National Oceanic and Atmospheric Administration approved the final
version of the tradable property rights program in 1990. See Ref. [16]. The surf clam
allocation included vessel catch (80%) and vessel capacity (20%). For vessels har-
vesting surf clams, the historical catch was equal to the vessel’s total harvest over
1979–1988 (counting the years 1985–1988 twice and dropping the vessel’s worst 2
years). Each vessel’s catch ratio was the vessel’s historical catch divided by the sum
of all vessels’ historical catch. The vessel’s cost factor was equal to the product of
the vessel’s length, width and volume. The vessel’s cost ratio was equal to the
vessel’s cost factor divided by the sum of the cost factors over all vessels. The
vessel’s initial surf clam allocation, as a percentage of the total harvest, was 0.8
(catch ratio)þ 0.2 (cost ratio). 8 Total payments in both years are in 1999 real dollars.
by another distinct firm. This case of an external contract is
depicted in our model. In contrast, the integrated firms may deduct
the cost of leasing quota from the boat’s trip under two cases: when
the firm leases the quota from another distinct firm (external
contract or lease), or when the quota is owned by the same firm but
was allocated to a different vessel (internal contract or lease). This
pattern of external (between distinct firms) and internal (between
units of the same firm) trades and contracts has been found in
industries in addition to the surf clam fishery [4]. We decided to
limit the analysis to the case of the independent firms for two
reasons. First, the model of combining external and internal
contracting is sufficiently complex to warrant a paper in and of
itself and is left for future research. Second, based on interviews, we
felt confident that an independent firm subtracts the cost of leasing
only if there is an external contract. Therefore, without making
assumptions about the unobserved contract (internal or external),
the data available to researchers allow us to identify those trips for
which the price of the quota is deducted in the case of an external
contract by an independent firm.
Section 2 presents a model that predicts that a share contract
between quota owners and boat owners will emerge in an ITQ
fishery. Extensive interviews of surf clam harvesters revealed that
transactions for surf clam ITQs are often bilateral trades between
industry participants rather than transactions in a standardmarket.
For transactions between two different firms (external trans-
actions), contracts specify how the price per bushel of clams is split
between the boat owner and the quota owner, with the boat owner
typically earning 50–60% of the output. For example, if an inde-
pendent fishing firm harvests using a quota owned by a clam
processor, the independent firm receives $5–6 per cage of clams out
of the $10market price [21,20,28,24]. This type of agreement and its
contribution to disputes over the welfare effects of ITQs has been
documented in other fisheries as well [7].
In addition, our model predicts that boat owners can pass some
of the cost of leasing ITQs onto the crew and still meet the partic-
ipation constraint. Indeed, empirical evidence shows that by 1994
a majority of harvesting firms (boat owners) had implemented
a new share system, where the cost of leasing quota was deducted
from gross revenues before sharing with the crew. The following
section compares harvest patterns between the trips with quota
owned by the boat owner’s (own quota) and trips with quota leased
from a quota owner (leased quota), in order to test the model
developed in Section 3. As predicted, trips with the boat owner’s
own quota tend to have a higher effort level than trips with leased
quota.
5.2. Changes in crew effort
Labor effort is a classic case of an unobservable or ‘‘hidden’’
action in a moral hazard problem [30]. In our case the observable
outcome correlated with the effort is the harvest rate. We feel
confident in comparing harvest rates over trips with owned and
leased quotas for purposes of empirical analysis because (1) the
major capital input, the vessel with its embedded technology, is
unchanged between trips; (2) the resource is currently harvested at
an estimated maximum sustainable yield and can be considered
stable between trips; (3) the time-frame for comparison is a matter
of days which reduces other confounding effects.
From 1992 to 1999, a total of 4372 fishing trips were reported, of
which 45% used leased quota. Themean harvest rate (in bushels per
hour) for trips with own quota is 11% higher than for trips with
leased quota (see Table 2). In addition to having a higher mean and
median, the harvest rate of trips with own quota displayed greater
variability than for trips with leased quota (standard deviation of
54.25 compared to 39.79 bushels per hour and interquartile range
(IQR) of 55.45 and 45.20). The period with the greatest deviation
between harvest rates was 1996–1999, when the mean harvest
rates of trips with owned quota were 29% higher than for trips with
leased quota.
Fig. 2 shows that harvest rates for trips using own quota
overtook rates for trips using leased quota in 1994, the year by
which amajority of boat owners had adopted the new share system
(where quota costs are subtracted from gross revenues before
sharing with crew). From then through 1999, mean harvest rates
using the boat owner’s own quota were always higher than mean
harvest rates using quota leased from the quota owner. From 1992
to 1993, before the general adoption of the new contracting system,
harvest rates using own quotawere actually lower than those using
leased quota. This preliminary result is consistent with the
prediction in Section 3 that effort levels will be higher for trips
using own quota than for trips using leased quota.
We used a paired t-test to verify that these differences between
mean harvest rates are statistically significant, pooling all data from
1994 to 1999. There are a total of nine vessels that harvest in each
year from 1994 to 1999 using both own and leased quotas
(in different trips). By matching themean harvest rate of both types
of trips based on the individual vessel, we rejected the null
hypothesis that mean harvest rates for the two types of trips are
equal (t-value¼ 2.78) at 5% significance level. It is important to
clarify that these changes are independent of a recent population
decline in the southern range of the surf clam habitat. The period of
decline was 1999–2002 and has been attributed to warmer waters
in this region [33]. We do not believe that this decline affects our
results for two reasons. First, our analysis is focused on the period
prior to the decline (1994–1999). Second, to test our hypothesis of
difference in rate of harvest for trips with leased versus owned
quotas, we are interested in variation between trip types, rather
than the changes over time.
Table 1
Change in payment to vessel crew, 1992–1999
1992 1993 1994 1995 1996 1997 1998 1999
Count of vessels 19 16 13 12 9 8 8 5
Count of vessels with
higher payments
relative to 1990
5 5 6 8 5 5 4 4
Table 2
Descriptive statistics for harvest rates over two types of trips, 1992–1999
N Mean SD Median IQR
Leased quota 1960 72.79 39.79 56.00 45.20
Own quota 2412 80.58 54.25 64.00 55.45
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Fig. 2. Annual mean harvest rate by ITQ ownership.
5.3. Regression results
The previous section showed that the mean harvest rate of trips
with own quota tends to be higher than that with leased quota. Our
regression analysis includes trips of the 17 vessels owned by firms
that both leased and owned quota from 1992 to 1999 (n¼ 2797).
Results are reported in Table 3. The dependent variable is the
harvest rate (bushels of surf clams per hour). Explanatory variables
include an indicator for trips with quota that are owned by the boat
owner and for which the crew receives the full 1/3 share of the
revenue, dummy variables for season the trip was taken and
a dummy variable for each of the vessels in the sample. The dummy
variable for the vessel captures the difference in the harvest rate
due to differences in the capital (e.g. age and size of vessel), any
geographical variation in surf clam abundance near the vessel’s
primary port and skill of the captain. To preserve confidentiality the
boat identifiers are suppressed: instead we differentiate the vessels
by dummy variables for the 17 active vessels (randomly assigned).
The base case is harvests in the winter with leased quota by vessel
17. The model as a whole is statistically significant (F-statistic
equals 164.32) and explains more than half of the observed
variation in the harvest rate (adjusted R-square is 0.5388). There
was no significant change in the stock of surf clams over the period
of interest [33].
The coefficient for trips taken with quota owned by the boat
owner (‘‘own’’) is 5.42 and is statistically significant (p-value¼
0.003). On average, trips taken with quota owned have a harvest
rate that is 5.42 bushels per hour greater than trips with leased
quota. To put this value in context, consider the fact that these
results indicate that the difference in harvest rates between trips
with owned versus leased quota is slightly larger than the differ-
ence in harvest rates between winter and fall, and substantially
greater than the difference in harvest rates between winter and
spring or summer. Furthermore, for the 17 vessels in these data the
difference in harvest rates between trips with owned quota and the
harvest rate on leased trips ranges from a minimum of 2.8% to
a maximum of 19.4% and has a mean of 8%. In other words, on
average the trips with owned quota had a harvest rate that was
almost 8% higher than those trips with leased quota. This result
provides substantial empirical support for the prediction of our
model, on trips with leased quota the crew share the cost of leasing
the quota and in response select a lower effort. The observable
outcome of lower effort level is a lower harvest rate.
6. Summary and conclusions
In evaluating alternative regulatory approaches to fisheries, it is
critical to consider all of the ways in which industry participants
will adapt to regulatory change. This paper provides a mathemat-
ical model to explain the contracting relationships under ITQs and
subsequent effort levels in a fishery by presenting an economic
model and then testing this model in the Mid-Atlantic surf clam
fishery.
Under ITQs, when boat owner, quota owner, and crew are risk
averse in a stochastic environment, share contracts between crew
and boat owners and share contracts between quota owners and
boat owners are economically rational. In addition, boat owners can
defray the cost of leasing ITQs by sharing this cost with the crew,
while still meeting the crew’s participation constraint. Under these
types of contracts, where the cost of leasing quota is shared
between boat owner and crew, the crew will expend a lower effort
level than on trips where the quota is owned outright by the boat
owner. The consequence of this hidden action is observable as
a higher harvest rate for trips using the boat owner’s own quota
than for trips using leased quota, as confirmed by an analysis of the
surf clam fishery.
Environmental regulations using market incentives, such as
ITQs, are increasingly popular internationally. As described in this
paper, the persistence and form of share contracts under these
policies could have important implications for the labor sector.
Appendix
Negotiation of contract
The optimization problem in this contract is for the boat owner
to maximize his utility subject to the participation constraints of
both quota owner and crew. That is, maximize
Ub ¼ E½Ibbb Var½Ib ¼ ð1 rÞ½PHaPðHqbÞ
qðHqbÞFCð1 rÞ2ð1aÞ2P2H2bbs2m
subject to :
Uq ¼ dMðHqbÞ ¼ aPðHqbÞþqðHqbÞa2P2H2bqs2m
0aPðHqbÞþqðHqbÞ ¼ a2P2H2bqs2mþdMðHqbÞ ðaÞ
The expected value of the quota owner’s return from leasing his
quotamust be sufficient to compensate him for the return hewould
obtain by selling the quota, plus the risk associated with the
uncertain output. The utility function for the crew is
Uc ¼WL¼ r½PHaPðHqbÞqðHqbÞr2ð1aÞ2P2H2bcs2m
0r½PHaPðHqbÞqðHqbÞ ¼ r2ð1aÞ2P2H2bcs2mþWL
(b)
The expected value of the crew’s return from joining the fishing
trip must be sufficient to compensate them for their opportunity
cost (the wage in next best employment), plus the risk associated
with the uncertain output.
There are four choice variables in this case: effort level (L), fixed
rental price of quota (q), crew share of revenue and variable cost of
crew (r), and share of the output price of quota owner (a).
Substituting constraints (a) and (b) into the boat owner’s utility
function, we get
Table 3
Regression results
Variable Coefficient Standard error P-value
Constant** 28.01 4.15 0.000
Own** 5.42 1.79 0.003
Spring 1.07 2.16 0.621
Summer 0.09 2.10 0.965
Fall* 5.21 2.05 0.011
Boat effects
Boat 1** 97.12 6.11 0.000
Boat 2** 21.07 5.98 0.000
Boat 3** 52.22 4.38 0.000
Boat 4** 18.55 4.62 0.000
Boat 5** 75.47 3.64 0.000
Boat 6** 49.23 5.86 0.000
Boat 7** 25.30 3.63 0.000
Boat 8** 81.14 4.58 0.000
Boat 9** 41.23 4.75 0.000
Boat 10** 11.43 5.36 0.033
Boat 11** 64.20 4.51 0.000
Boat 12** 163.62 4.15 0.000
Boat 13** 58.81 4.56 0.000
Boat 14** 88.21 6.90 0.000
Boat 15** 48.83 5.11 0.000
Boat 16** 57.61 8.00 0.000
*Significant at the 5% level.
**Significant at the 1% level.
Ub ¼ PH  a2P2H2bqs2m  dMðH  qbÞ  r2ð1 aÞ2
P2H2bcs2m WL FC ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2P2H2bbs2m
0Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC P2H2
s2m
h
a2bq þ r2ð1 aÞ2bc þ ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2bb
i
The value of a and r that maximizes Ub will be the solution to:
Min D ¼ a2bq þ r2ð1 aÞ2bc þ ð1 rÞ2ð1 aÞ2bb
Differentiate D with respect to a to get the first-order condition:
vD
va
¼ 2abq  2ð1 aÞr2bc  2ð1 aÞð1 rÞ2bb ¼ 0
0a
h
bq þ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
i
¼ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
0a* ¼ r
2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
bq þ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
Differentiate D with respect to r to get the other first-order
condition:
vD
vr
¼ 2rbc  2ð1 rÞbb ¼ 0
0r* ¼ bb
bb þ bc
Our result shows that the optimal choice of share value between
boat owner and crewmember under ITQs is the same as the general
result documented by Plourde and Smith [27]. Note that the
optimal parameter r* will be independent of market variables such
as wage, price, and employment [27].
Substitute r*¼ bb/(bbþ bc) back into a* to get
a* ¼ r
2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
bq þ r2bc þ ð1 rÞ2bb
¼ bbbc
bqðbb þ bcÞ þ bbbc
From this expression, we notice that a* is always between 0 and 1.
It is equal to 0 if and only if bb or bc is zero – in another words,
when boat owner or crew member is risk neutral. Since we have
assumed that both of them are risk averse, a* will not be zero. This
means that whenever production is feasible, a share contract
between boat owner and quota owner is optimal. Note that the
optimal share parameter a* is also independent of market variables
such as output price and effort level; it is purely determined by the
risk aversion parameters of boat owner, crew member and quota
owner.
Substitute r*¼ bb/(bbþ bc) and a*¼ bbbc/(bq(bbþ bc)þ bbbc)
back into the objective function of D to get the minimumvalue of D.
Through simple mathematical manipulation, we can get
D* ¼ bqa*
Substitute D*¼ bqa* back into boat owner’s utility function to get
Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC P2H2s2mD*
¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC P2H2s2mbqa*
Let s2mbqa
* ¼ k, the objective function now becomes
MaxL Ub ¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC P2H2s2mD*
¼ PH  dMðH  qbÞ WL FC kP2H2
Differentiate Ub with respect to L to get the first-order condition:
VL ¼ PHL  dMHl W  2kP2HHL ¼ 0
The second-order condition is
VLL ¼ PHLL  dMHLL  2kP2

H2L þ HHLL

<0
By the implicit function theorem, we can solve the first-order condi-
tion to get the explicit expression of choice variable L*(k, P,M,W, d).
Differentiate the first-order condition with respect to k, we
then get
PHLL
vL*
vk
dMHLL
vL*
vk
2P2HHL2kP2H2L
vL*
vk
2kP2HHLL
vL*
vk
¼ 0
0
vL*
vk
¼ 2P
2HHL
PHLLdMHLL2kP2

H2L þHHLL

By the second-order condition, the denominator is less than zero.
We then could sign it as
0
vL*
vk
< 0
Since k is an increasing function of a*, the optimal employment and
output level for a boat owner will be smaller when he faces output
price sharing quota leasing than the situation when he faces the
fixed rental price quota leasing.
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